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Substantial data from the cognitive neurosciences point to the importance of bodily processing for the development of a comprehensive
theory of the self. A key aspect of the bodily self is self-location, the experience that the self is localized at a specific position in spacewithin
one’s bodily borders (embodied self-location). Although the neural mechanisms of self-location have been studied by manipulating the
spatial location of one’s visual perspective during mental imagery, such experiments were conducted in constrained, explicit, and
unecological contexts such as explicit instructions in a prone/seated position, although most human interactions occur spontaneously
while standing/walking. Using a motor paradigm, we investigated the behavioral and neural mechanisms of spontaneous self-location
andmental body transformations during active human interaction. Using own-body imagery using spontaneous and explicit changes in
self-location in standingparticipants,we report that spontaneous interactionswith an avatar are neurally indistinguishable fromexplicit
own-body transformationwith disembodied self-location but differ from explicit own-body transformationwith embodied self-location
at 400–600 ms after stimulus onset. We discuss these findings with respect to the neural mechanisms of perspective-taking and self-
location in spontaneous human interaction.
Introduction
Theoretical work converges on the importance of the bodily self for
the development of a comprehensive theory of the self (Gallagher,
2000, 2005; Ruby and Decety, 2001; Metzinger, 2003, 2008). A key
aspect of the bodily self is self-location, the experience that the self is
localized at a specific position in space within one’s bodily borders
(embodied self-location) (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Self-
location is difficult to study but, based on data from neurological
patients with out-of-body experiences (OBEs) and related condi-
tions (Irwin, 1985;Devinsky et al., 1989;Brugger et al., 1997;Kahane
et al., 2003; Blanke et al., 2004) (disembodied self-location), neuro-
scientific approaches pointed to the importance of multisensory in-
tegration of body-related information in temporo-parietal cortex
(Lobel et al., 1998; Blanke et al., 2002, 2004; Kahane et al., 2003).
Using neuroimaging, researchers investigated the neural
mechanisms of self-location by manipulating the spatial location
of one’s visual perspective during mental imagery. This revealed
activations within many brain areas: temporo-parietal, precu-
neus, prefrontal, premotor, superior temporal, and cingulate
cortex (Ruby and Decety, 2001; David et al., 2006; Vogeley and
Kupke, 2007). Recent electrical neuroimaging studies (Blanke et
al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006) showed that embodied and disembod-
ied self-location differently activate the temporo-parietal junc-
tion (TPJ) and the lateral occipitotemporal cortex, including the
extrastriate body area (Downing et al., 2001; Astafiev et al., 2004;
David et al., 2007).
Most studies on self-location did not investigate self-location
while an individual is interacting with another individual but
used highly constant and constrained contexts rendering the ex-
perimental situations less ecologically valid. Typically, behavior
and brain activity are tested in a prone/seated position, although
many or evenmost interactions with humans occur in the stand-
ing orwalking position (Parsons, 1987; Arzy et al., 2006; Reed and
McGoldrick, 2007), and brainmechanismsmay differ depending
on the body position (Gaunet and Berthoz, 2000; Arzy et al.,
2006; Lobmaier andMast, 2007). Moreover, most neuroimaging
studies [i.e., functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or
positron emission tomography (PET)] are performed in the su-
pine position. Finally, participants are generally instructed
explicitly to perform own-body or perspective mental trans-
formations (Zacks et al., 1999; Ruby and Decety, 2001, 2004;
Vogeley et al., 2004; Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006). It is thus
unclear whether and how the standing position as well as spon-
taneous versus explicit transformations affect mental imagery re-
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lated to self-location (Scheflen, 1964; Bavelas et al., 1987, 1988;
Thirioux et al., 2009). Accordingly, the mechanisms of “sponta-
neous” mental body transformations in “naturalistic” and “eco-
logically more valid” conditions are still unknown.
Here, we adapted a spontaneous motor paradigm (Bavelas et
al., 1988) and investigated, using electrical neuroimaging, the
neural mechanisms of spontaneous and explicit changes in self-
location. This was done in standing and moving participants in-
teracting with an avatar that was standing andmoving. We report
behavioral and electrophysiological data revealing that spontaneous
self–other interactions and explicit mental own-body transfor-
mations with disembodied self-location rely on indistinguish-
able behavioral and brain mechanisms.
Materials andMethods
Paradigm
To investigate whether and how individuals, under spontaneous condi-
tions and without explicit instruction, interact with another individual
with an embodied or disembodied self-location, we designed a motor
paradigm that allows the participants to use spontaneously their own
transformation strategy, comparable with strategies used in daily life. For
this, we adapted the traditional psychological approach, an approach
focusing on elementary mimicry (Bavelas et al., 1988) that is used to
investigate, from the body posture, how individuals act together without
explicit task instructions (Scheflen, 1964;O’Toole andDubin, 1968; Stot-
land, 1969; Bavelas et al., 1986a,b, 1987, 1988; Chartrand and Bargh,
1999; Tessari et al., 2002). This rotation and reflection symmetry para-
digm (Bavelas et al., 1988; Thirioux et al., 2009) was adapted andmerged
with a paradigm using embodied and disembodied self-location during
mental own-body imagery.
According to the hypothesis by Bavelas et al. (1988), if individuals A
andB are facing each other andB is leaning to his right,A can copyB’s tilt
by leaning either to his left or right (Fig. 1A). In the first case, A reacts by
mirroring B’s tilts. We hypothesized that such “reflection symmetry” (as
labeled by Bavelas et al., 1987, 1988; or body tilts “in mirror reversal,” as
in the study by Brugger, 2002) indicates that A, imagining his own-body
at his actual body position [physical or “em-
bodied” position (Arzy et al., 2006; Thirioux et
al., 2009)], is further imagining that B’s tilts are
his own-bodymovements as reflected in amir-
ror. In contrast, we hypothesized that the sec-
ond case or “rotation symmetry” (Bavelas et
al., 1987, 1988; or body tilts “with preservation
of the lateral asymmetry,” as in the study by
Brugger, 2002) reflects that A is imagining
himself at the B’s body position (“disembod-
ied” position) (Arzy et al., 2006; Thirioux et al.,
2009), by performing a mental transformation
of his body (or mental rotation). Hence, the
type of symmetry (either reflection or rotation
symmetry)may provide an empirical criterion to
infer which sort of mental body transformations
is being performed within self–other interaction
(i.e., either imagining the other’s body as one’s
own body as reflected in themirror or imagining
one’s own body at the other’s body position).
“Reflection” and “rotation” symmetry thus indi-
cates that the“self” (theparticipant) is interacting
with the “other” (an avatar, in the present case)
with embodied and disembodied self-location,
respectively, as shown in a recent behavioral
study using virtual reality technology (Thirioux
et al., 2009). Here, we will use “embodied self-
location” (or mental body transformation with
embodied self-location) and “disembodied self-
location” (or mental body transformation with
disembodied self-location) to refer to reflection
symmetry and rotation symmetry, respectively.
Participants
Thirteen healthy volunteers took part in this experiment. We excluded
the data from four participants because of EEG artifacts attributable to
standing position and leaning movements. For the final analysis, we
included the data from the remaining nine participants (four women,
five men; aged 23–32 years; mean SD age, 27 2.5 years). All partic-
ipants were right-handed according to the Edinburgh handedness inven-
tory (Oldfield, 1971) and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
None reported neurological or psychiatric disorders. All were naive to the
purpose of the experiment and gave written informed consent. The study
protocol was approved by the local ethics research committee at theUniver-
sityofLausanne [UniversityHospital (CentreHospitalierUniversitaireVau-
dois), Lausanne, Switzerland] and has been performed in accordance with
the ethical standards laid down in the Declaration of Helsinki.
Experimental setup and procedures
Stimulus and apparatus
Participants stood in front of a computer screen (size, 18.6  24.8° of
visual angle) at a viewing distance of 80 cm. The computer screen was
mounted at eye level and adjusted for each participant (Fig. 1B). We
presented movies of a computer-generated female tightrope walker (im-
ages per movie, 37; refresh rate, 100 Hz; movie duration, 1480 ms) (Fig.
1C). The tightrope walker was designed using the AnyFlo System (Bret,
1988), which generates virtual avatars with a neural network model tak-
ing into account the rules of natural movements and biomechanical
constraints of the body (Viviani and Terzuolo, 1982; Viviani and Flash,
1995; Berthoz, 1997). Movies were presented using E-Prime software
(Psychology Software). A trial contained one movie and was initiated
after a variable interstimulus interval (randomly chosen between 500 and
2000 ms; mean, 1500 ms) during which a white fixation cross was em-
bedded onto a black screen. The movies presented the tightrope walker
standing on a ropewith the arms horizontally outstretched (Fig. 1C). The
tightrope walker was shown either in front-, profile-, or back-facing
orientation. For each orientation, the tightrope walker executed tilts to
either her left or her right. Hence, we presented six different movies (see
Figure 1. Theoretical setup and stimuli.A, Reflection and rotation symmetry schema. Two individuals, A and B, are facing each
other. In reflection symmetry (or embodied self-location), A is leaning to his left when B is leaning to his right (yellow arrows) and
vice versa (red arrows) as if Awere keeping his own visuospatial perspective while imagining his own body at its actual position
(physical) and that B’s tilts were his own-body movements as reflected in a mirror. In rotation symmetry (or disembodied self-
location), A is leaning to his left when B is leaning to his left (yellow arrows) and vice versa (red arrows), as if A were taking B’s
visuospatial perspective by imagining his own-body at the B’s body position and performing a mental rotation of his body.
B, Experimental setup. Participantswere facing a computer screen and standing in Romberg position on awooden board thatwas
fixed on theground. Theywere holding ametal bar (with response buttons; indicated in red) horizontally in front of them.C,Movie
samples as used in the three tasks. A virtual female tightropewalker, performingwhole-body tilts either to her left (L) or right (R),
from different orientations (front or back facing), was shown on the computer screen (profile orientation not shown).
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supplemental data, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental ma-
terial). In each movie, the onset of the tilt of the tightrope walker was
delayed with respect to the stimulus onset by 50 ms (i.e., the tightrope
walker stood motionless on the rope for 50 ms).
To reinforce interaction giving participants the impression to act in
the same spatial environment as the tightrope walker, participants stood
on a wooden board (3 10 75 cm, heightwidth length) approx-
imating the unbalanced position as the tightrope walker. We asked par-
ticipants to stand in the so-called “Romberg position” (Romberg, 1846)
with one foot in front of the other and to choose the most comfortable
position (i.e., either with the right or left foot in front of the other). Five
participants (twowomen, threemen) chose standingwith their right foot
in front of the left. Participants held ametal bar (length, 65 cm) horizon-
tally in front of them and placed their thumbs on two buttons positioned
at the left and right end of the bar (Fig. 1B). These buttons were used to
record the tilt direction (left or right) and reaction times (RTs).
Tasks
Spontaneous task. Participants were instructed to observe the tilts of the
tightrope walker and to lean when she was leaning. We consider this
condition as spontaneous insofar as no instructionwith respect to type of
transformation strategy or direction of leaningwas given. This allowedus
to investigate whether participants would lean spontaneously according
to an embodied or disembodied self-location (see also below). The exact
instruction was as follows: “You are going to see a female tightrope
walker leaning on a rope. Please lean when she is leaning.” All partici-
pants started with this spontaneous task (SPO task) and then continued
with the two explicit tasks.
Explicit tasks. To investigate whether the spontaneous transformation
strategies are relying on the same or distinct brainmechanisms as explicit
mental own-body transformations with embodied or disembodied self-
location (Arzy et al., 2006), participants, in the second and third experi-
mental tasks, were instructed explicitly to perform two mental body
transformation tasks while leaning [own-body-transformation task
(OBT task); mirroring task (MIR task)]. The order of both explicit tasks
was counterbalanced (in five participants, the OBT task was delivered
before the MIR task; reversed order in the remaining participants).
In the OBT task, participants were asked to lean when the tightrope
walker was leaning, while imagining their body in the position of the
tightrope walker’s body (i.e., using disembodied self-location) (Arzy et
al., 2006). For the front- and profile-facing orientations, we expected the
direction of participants’ body tilts toward their left when the tightrope
walker leaned to her left and vice versa. For the back-facing orientation,
we expected an ipsilateral leaning pattern (left tilt of participants when
the tightrope walker leans to her left and vice versa).
In theMIR task (Arzy et al., 2006), participants were instructed to lean
while imagining their body at their actual body position (or embodied
self-location) and that the tightrope walker’s tilts were their own-body
movements as reflected in a mirror. Accordingly, we expected for the
front- and profile-facing orientations that the participants lean to their
right when the tightrope walker leaned to her left and vice versa. For the
back-facing orientation,we expected right tilts when the tightropewalker
leans to her right and vice versa.
In all tasks, participants were instructed to initiate their tilt with the
same speed as the avatar’s tilt and to press with their thumb the left or
right button of the bar corresponding to the direction of their tilt (i.e., the
left and right button in case of tilt to the left and right, respectively) when
they judged that their tilt had arrived at its maximal amplitude. In a
training session, before the experiment, participants were instructed to
lean to the left or right and to press the corresponding button at the same
time. Before task performance and after the spontaneous task, OBT and
MIR tasks were trained in 90 trials (on average, participants performed cor-
rectly in 85% of trials). In OBT andMIR tasks, participants were instructed
to perform the requestedmental imagery before giving the response.
Each condition contained three blocks. Within a block, in a random
order, each of the sixmovies appeared 15 times, giving rise to 90 trials per
block and 270 trials per condition. Our major aim was to investigate the
behavioral and neural patterns of spontaneous mental body transforma-
tions and compare them with those of explicit mental body transforma-
tions. Because our previous EEG work on explicit mental body
transformationswith embodied and disembodied self-location only con-
sidered front- and back-facing orientations (Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et
al., 2006; Mohr et al., 2006) and to facilitate statistical analysis and com-
parability with this previous work, we here focus for behavioral and EEG
analysis also on the front- and back-facing orientations in all three tasks.
Acquisition and analysis of behavioral data
For each trial, E-Prime recorded the tilt direction (left or right as indi-
cated by button presses) and the reaction time. For each combination of
task (SPO, OBT, and MIR tasks) and orientation (front and back), we
computed the percentage of tilts according to embodied or disembodied
self-location (see above, Experimental setup and procedures). For the
MIR and OBT tasks, we computed mean reaction times for responses
with embodied and disembodied self-location, respectively. For the SPO
task, we calculated the mean reaction times for tilts in OBT or MIR
manner.
For statistical analysis, we first computed a 3  2 repeated-measures
ANOVA on the percentage of tilts in OBT manner with the factors task
(SPO, OBT, andMIR tasks) and orientation (front and back). The direc-
tion of tilts allowed analyzingwhether tilts in SPOwere similar to those of
the OBT orMIR task. For response speed, we computed a 3 2 ANOVA
on the RTs with task and orientation as factors.
Electroencephalography acquisition and preprocessing
Continuous EEGwas acquired from192 scalp electrodes (Biosemi Active
Two System; 2048 Hz sampling rate) in a darkened electrically shielded
booth. To calculate the event-related potentials (EPs), epochs of EEG
(from 100 ms before movie onset to 1300 ms after movie offset), from
trials that provided the prevailing symmetry in the SPO task and the
correct responses in the explicit tasks (i.e., tilts related to embodied and
disembodied self-location for MIR and OBT tasks, respectively), were
averaged for each of the three tasks and for each participant. We rejected
sweeps in which any channel exceeded the amplitude of 100 V. To
reject epochs with blinks, eye movements, or other sources of transient
noise, the data were additionally visually inspected. Artifacted channels
were excluded and interpolated (Perrin et al., 1987). After this procedure
and before group averaging, EPs were bandpass filtered (1–40 Hz) and
recalculated against the average reference (Lehmann, 1987). Further-
more, for each task, the EPs of each participant were aligned such that the
global field power (GFP) (Lehmann and Skrandies, 1980) peak of the P1
component was at 100 ms poststimulus onset (PSO). This was done to
minimize intersubject variability of the evoked brain responses as re-
ported in previouswork (Morand et al., 2000; Picton et al., 2000; Goffaux
et al., 2003; Murray et al., 2004).
The total number of included trials for each EP across tasks and ori-
entations did not differ with respect to the number of tilts in the right or
left direction (3 2 2 ANOVA with factors task, orientation, and tilt
direction): tilt direction (F(1,8) 2.187; p 0.177); task tilt direction
(F(2,16) 0.152; p 0.861); tilt direction orientation (F(1,8) 0.229;
p  0.645); task  tilt direction  orientation (F(2,16)  0.144; p 
0.867). The total number of trials in the front-facing OBT task was 56
5 (mean SEM), with the same number of tilts to the left (28 3) and
right (28  2). The same was found for back orientation (56  7; left,
28 3; right, 28 4). In the MIR task [total front, 46 5 (left, 23.1
2.9; right, 22.8 2.8); total back, 33 7 (left, 18 4; right, 16 4)] and
the SPO task [total front, 61 6 (left, 31 3; right, 30 3); total back,
58 (left, 30 3; right, 29 2)], the same number of right–left tilts were
observed as well. Hence, the number of trials for our EPs analysis in-
cluded, on average, between 46 and 58 artifact-free epochs per condition
(except back MIR task condition; for additional discussion, see behav-
ioral results). We note that EPs based on50 epochs may be noisy and
characterized by large variability. This may have rendered it difficult to
reliably detect modulations of small-amplitude components in the
present study. However, our experiment was already quite long, and
participants were standing and performed full-body movements during
the EEG recording. For these reasons, we decided to not prolong the
experiment and record more epochs per condition.
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EP topographical mapping
EP analysis was based on the examination of spatial variations of the scalp
voltage distribution over time and between tasks. Known as EP topo-
graphical mapping (Michel et al., 2001, 2004; Blanke et al., 2005; Murray
et al., 2005, 2008a; Arzy et al., 2006; Mercier et al., 2009), this approach
searches for time periods of stable map topography within and across
experimental conditions. Periods of stable map topography (or EPmap)
were defined by using a clustering algorithm [hierarchical clustering:
atomize and agglomerate hierarchical clustering (AAHC) (adapted from
Tibshirani et al., 2005)]. This AAHC is dependent on the quantification
of the global explained variance (GEV):
GEV 

t1
tmax
(GFP2 ev)

t1
tmax
GFP2
,
which corresponds to the goodness of fit of a template map during a
certain time period (Murray et al., 2008a) and the instantaneous GFP
(Lehmann and Skrandies, 1980):
GFPu 
i1n ui2
n
.
The AAHC identifies the dominantmap topographies on the scalp in the
group-averaged EPs across the experimental tasks over time. This tem-
poral topographical analysis labeled each time frame of the EEG data to
the corresponding dominant EPmap. This is graphically rendered with a
color and number per template EP map (see Fig. 3B). The optimal num-
ber of the template EP maps is determined by both a modified cross-
validation (CV) criterion (Pascual-Marqui et al., 1995; Murray et al.,
2008a; Mercier et al., 2009) and the Krzanowski–Lai (KL) criterion (Tib-
shirani et al., 2005; Murray et al., 2008a). The absolute minimum of the
CV, in which the degrees of freedom and the GEV are optimized for a
given set of template maps, gives the optimal number of segments, and
the highest value of the KL indicates the optimal clustering (for a detailed
description, see Murray et al., 2008a).
A major aim of our study was to investigate whether spontaneous
mental own-body transformation strategies elicit the same or distinct
brain mechanisms as explicit mental own-body transformations with
embodied (MIR task) or disembodied self-location (OBT task). Our
analysis of the behavioral data (see below) showed that, despite generally
prolonged RTs for the SPO task, the behavior with respect to orientation
in the SPO task was similar to the OBT task but differed from the MIR
task. To investigate the presence of such similarities/differences in the
EPs, we computed a segmentation of the group-averaged data with the
grand average EP for SPO, OBT, and MIR tasks in the front and back
orientations (3 2 factorial design).
For statistical analysis, the presence of a given EP map as identified in
the group-averaged datawas verified in the EPs of the individual subjects,
by means of a fitting procedure based on the spatial correlation between
template maps obtained from the group-averaged EPs data and the indi-
vidual subjects data (Brandeis and Lehmann, 1986; Pegna et al., 1997;
Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006). Thus, the dominant EP maps as
identified by the segmentation procedure in the group-averaged data
were fitted to the EPs of each individual subject (Blanke et al., 2005;
Murray et al., 2008a; Mercier et al., 2009). This fitting procedure is based
on the spatial correlation between template EP maps obtained from the
group-averaged EPs data and the individual subject data (Brandeis and
Lehmann, 1986; Pegna et al., 1997; Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006;
Murray et al., 2008a; Mercier et al., 2009). This allowed us to determine
the duration (map presence) and the amount of GEV.Map presence was
determined to analyze the presence of a given EPmap versus another EP
map in the EP data during the time period as detected by segmentation
analysis. GEV was determined to analyze the goodness of fit of the EP
data with a given EP during the time period as detected by segmentation
analysis. Values formap presence and GEV for a given EPmapwere then
subjected to statistical analysis (repeated-measures ANOVA).
Distributed source localization
The neural generators were estimated by using a distributed linear in-
verse solution based on a local auto-regressive average (LAURA) model
(Grave de Peralta Menendez et al., 2004) and biophysical constraints,
producing adequate source localizations with high temporal resolution
(Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006; Mercier et al., 2009; Plomp et al.,
2009). Within the gray matter of the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) 152 template brain, we defined a solution space of 4022 evenly
spread source points (or solution points). We transformed the MNI
volume to a best-fitting sphere [Spherical Model with Anatomical Con-
straints (Spinelli et al., 2000)] andused a three-shell spherical headmodel
to calculate the lead field for the 192 electrodes and the LAURA inverse
solution. Thus, we estimated current densities throughout the source
space for each participant at each time point for each condition and
spatial orientation.
The source reconstruction was performed at two levels (Michel et al.,
2001, 2004; Murray et al., 2004; Mercier et al., 2009). First, we applied
LAURA to those EP maps that differed between conditions as identified
by the segmentation and statistical EP analysis. This was done for the
time periodwhen these EPmapswere found to differ between conditions
by the topographical analysis (i.e., between 517 and 628 ms in the front
orientation). This allowed us to visualize the underlying neural genera-
tors. Second, we performed statistical analysis at the level of the source
reconstruction. For this, we calculated the mean difference between
source estimations for each condition across subjects in the time period
identified by the segmentation analysis (at 517–628 ms). To identify
solution points in the solution space for statistical comparisons, we ap-
plied a threshold of one-third of the amplitude of the unsubtracted
source estimations to this difference. This identified eight clusters of
solution points. Then, we determined for each participant and each con-
dition (between 517 and 628 ms; see below) the scalar values from the
solution points of each cluster and submitted them to repeated-measures
ANOVAs (one for each cluster) with two factors (task and solution
points within cluster) (Murray et al., 2008b). We used a Bonferroni’s
corrected  level of 0.00625.
Results
Behavioral data
Participants performed correctly for OBT andMIR tasks leaning
correctly with disembodied self-location in the OBT task (98.6
0.7%, mean  SEM) (Fig. 2A; Tables 1, 2) and with embodied
self-location in theMIR task (88.6 11%) (Fig. 2A; Tables 1, 2).
Figure 2. Behavioral results: leaning performance and reaction times. A, Tilt performance.
Results show that, in the SPO task, participants behaved as in the OBT task: they performed tilts
in a OBT manner independently of the stimulus orientation. In the SPO and OBT tasks, tilt
performance decreased when the rotation angle between the participants’ body and the ava-
tar’s body increased (from back to front). The MIR task was characterized by the inverse tilt
pattern. B, Back; F, front. B, Reaction times. Consistent with tilt performance, RTs increased
from back to front orientation in the SPO and OBT tasks. There was no significant difference
between the back and front orientation in the MIR task.
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Visual inspection revealed that the tilt performance in the SPO
task followed closely the tilt performance in the OBT task but
differed from the tilt performance in the MIR task (Tables 1, 2):
although we gave no explicit instructions (concerning the direc-
tion of leaning or transformation strategies) in the SPO task (that
was always performed first), all nine participants leaned in OBT
manner in almost all trials (97.1  1.3%) (Fig. 2A; Tables 1, 2).
Thiswas confirmed by a 3 2 repeated-measuresANOVAon the
leaning performance (number of OBT tilts in all conditions; see
Materials and Methods) for the three tasks showing a significant
effect of task (F(2,16) 140.992; p 0.001) that was attributable
to a significant difference between the MIR and OBT tasks [p
0.001, pairwise comparison, least significant difference (LSD)]
and theMIR and SPO tasks ( p 0.001). By contrast, the SPOand
OBT tasks did not significantly differ ( p  0.216). The 3  2
ANOVA also showed a trend for the factor orientation (F(2,16)
3.526; p  0.097). There was no task  orientation interaction
(F(2,16) 1.639; p 0.189).
As expected, in the OBT task, correct performance was higher
in the back (99.6 0.3%) than in the front (97.6 0.8%) orien-
tation (Fig. 2A; Tables 1, 2), in accordance with previous data
(Arzy et al., 2006). In theMIR task, our results showed the inverse
behavioral pattern as in the OBT task. Correct performance was
higher in the front (99.5 0.3%) than in the back (77.7 14.4%)
orientation (Fig. 2A; Tables 1, 2), also concordant with previous
data (Arzy et al., 2006). In the SPO task, OBT tilt performance
was higher in the back (99  0.5%) than in the front (95.4 
1.5%) orientation (Tables 1, 2; Fig. 2A). The absence of a signif-
icant orientation  interaction effect was probably attributable
to large variability in tilt performance in the back-facing condi-
tion of theMIR task: analysis of each participant’s individual data
showed that, for the back orientation, two outliers (onemale and
one female; both are included in group analysis) performedmost
tilts with disembodied self-location [participant 3: tilts in OBT
manner, 96.8%; tilts in MIR manner, 3.2%; participant 4: tilts in
OBT manner, 98.8%; tilts in MIR manner, 1.2% (Table 2)]. In
contrast, inspection of the OBT task and SPO task data indicates
that participants performed more tilts with disembodied self-
location for the back than the front orientation (Fig. 2A; Tables 1,
2). To check whether the gender of the participant might have
influenced performance in our task, we performed an unpaired
3 2 2 repeated-measures ANOVA (with task, spatial orien-
tation, and gender as factors).We foundno effect of gender (F(1,7)
 1.262; p  0.298), no task  gender interaction (F(2,14) 
0.096; p 0.909), no orientation gender interaction (F(2,14)
0.124; p  0.735), and no task  orientation  gender interac-
tion (F(2,14) 0.055; p 0.947).
For RTs, statistical analysis (3  2 repeated-measures
ANOVA with the factors task and orientation) showed a signifi-
cant effect of task (F(2,16) 5.966; p 0.012), a significant effect
of orientation (F(1,8)  25.292; p  0.001), and a significant
task orientation interaction (F(2,16) 11.524; p 0.001). RTs
were longer during the SPO task (1045 72.2ms;meanRT) than
the OBT task (906 45.5 ms; p 0.016, pairwise comparisons)
andMIR task (918 48.5ms; p 0.039) (Fig. 2B; Tables 1, 2). In
theOBT task, the spatial orientation affected the RTs, similarly to
the tilt performance: RTswere faster for the back (848 46.0ms)
compared with the front (965  37.8 ms; p  0.001, pairwise
comparison) orientation (Fig. 2B; Tables 1, 2). In theMIR task, as
already mentioned for tilt performance, RTs were not higher in
the back-facing condition, aswe predicted based onprevious data
(Arzy et al., 2006): participants were somewhat faster for the back
orientation (895 51.4ms) than for the front orientation (942
47.0 ms) (Fig. 2B; Tables 1, 2). This was not found to be signifi-
cant ( p 0.078). In the SPO task, participants were significantly
faster for the back (963 72.3ms) than for the front (1126 64.7
ms; p 0.001, pairwise comparison) orientation (Fig. 2B; Tables
1, 2), again similar to the effects observed during the OBT task.
Collectively, these behavioral data show that, although partic-
ipants performed generally slower in the SPO task, the responses
were compatible with those in the explicit OBT task: participants
leaned with disembodied self-location and showed similar de-
pendencies of tilt performance and response speed on the spatial
orientation. Thus, performance in the SPO task shows an orien-
tation effect as in the OBT task, and, in both tasks, OBT tilts
decrease and RTs increase when the rotation angle between the
Table 1. Tilt performance and reaction times (group data)
MIR task OBT task SPO task
%MIR RT (ms) % OBT RT (ms) % OBT RT (ms)
Back 77.7 14.4 895 51 99.6 0.3 848 46 99.0 0.5 963 72
Front 99.5 0.3 942 47 97.6 0.8 965 38 95.4 1.5 1126 65
All 88.6 11 918 48.5 98.6 0.7 906 45.5 97.1 1.3 1045 72.2
Percentages of tilts (inMIRmanner for theMIR task, inOBTmanner for theOBT andSPO tasks), and corresponding reaction times are shown for each spatial orientation (back and front). Final row shows themean tilts andRTs averaged across
the two orientations.
Table 2. Tilt performance and reaction times (individual data)
MIR task OBT task SPO task
Back Front Back Front Back Front
%MIR RT (ms) %MIR RT (ms) % OBT RT (ms) % OBT RT (ms) % OBT RT (ms) % OBT RT (ms)
P1 100.0 843 100.0 856 100.0 718 100.0 778 100.0 722 100.0 903
P2 98.6 1014 100.0 972 100.0 939 100.0 995 100.0 921 100.0 939
P3 2.2 688 98.8 844 100.0 807 93.0 1015 100.0 763 95.0 1028
P4 1.2 790 100.0 791 97.7 663 95.5 862 100.0 731 97.8 881
P5 98.8 1053 100.0 1203 98.9 900 97.7 986 100.0 1100 94.4 1259
P6 100.0 991 100.0 1015 100.0 962 98.9 996 100.0 1009 95.8 1184
P7 98.3 998 97.5 1017 100.0 886 97.5 1007 95.3 1271 84.7 1345
P8 100.0 651 100.0 760 100.0 690 95.5 875 97.8 877 95.6 1200
P9 100.0 1018 98.8 1021 100.0 1069 100.0 1172 98.9 1279 93.3 1396
Tilts and RTs are indicated as in Table 1 but are shown here for each participant (P) and each spatial orientation separately (back and front).
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participant’s body and the body of the tightrope walker increases,
replicating and extending previous behavioral findings (Parsons,
1987; Zacks et al., 1999; Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006;Mohr
et al., 2006). The tasks only differed in that participants were
slower in the SPO task than in the OBT task, suggesting that the
explicit instruction in the OBT task, probably involving motor
preparation, may have contributed to reducing the time that par-
ticipants needed to react. At a motor representational level, this
spontaneous leaning performance pattern in an OBT-like man-
ner may be compatible with the “active intermodal matching
model” (Meltzoff and Moore, 1997, 2002) assuming that ob-
served movements are reproduced by the corresponding ana-
tomical body parts (for instance, raising one’s own right arm
while a facing individual is raising his right arm) via “the repre-
sentation of both actions within a single representational frame-
work of organs relations” (Chiavarino et al., 2007). In contrast,
the distinct leaning performance in the MIR task is rather com-
patible with the perceptual-motormappingmodel (Butterworth,
1990; Gray et al., 1991; Wohlschla¨ger et al., 2003) according to
which perceiving an action activates automatically the observer’s
corresponding motor program by the activation of a common rep-
resentational coding so that one’s own movements visually match
the model’s movements [for instance, raising one’s own left arm
while a facing individual is raising his right arm (Wohlschla¨ger et al.,
2003)].
EPmapping and source localization
Our behavioral data showed that the behavior with respect to
orientation in the SPO task was similar to the OBT task but dif-
fered significantly from theMIR task. To investigate the potential
presence of comparable differences (between the SPO and OBT
tasks with respect to the MIR task), at the neural level, we com-
puted a segmentation of the group-averaged data with the grand
average EP for SPO, OBT, and MIR tasks in the front and back
orientations.
Reflecting the behavioral data, brain activations differed ac-
cording to orientation and whether the SPO/OBT task or the
MIR task was performed. This was reflected by the presence of
three different EP maps (Fig. 3B). One EP map (labeled by the
segmentation analysis as “Map6”) (Fig. 3B, black segment) was
present in the SPO/OBT task and another EP map (“Map14”)
(Fig. 3B, gray segment; see also A) in the MIR task (Fig. 3B) but
only in the front-facing conditions. An additional EP map
(“Map11”) (Fig. 3B, light gray segment) was found in all six con-
ditions but was more strongly associated with the back-facing
conditions.Map6 appeared between 517 and 628msPSO, and the
MIR task was characterized, during the same time period, by
Map14. In the back conditions, we did not find Map6 and Map14
in the time period between 517 and 628 ms and not in earlier as
well as later time periods (Fig. 3B). To test the dependence of
Map6 and Map14 on the factors task and orientation, we fitted
both template EP maps to the individual participants’ data in all
six conditions in the time period from 517 to 628 ms (3 2 2
repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors task, orientation,
and map). Concerning map presence, this analysis revealed a
significant taskmap orientation interaction (F(2,16) 3.988;
p 0.039) and a significant orientationmap interaction (F(1,8)
9.782; p  0.014). Post hoc tests (pairwise comparison, LSD)
revealed that the presence of Map6 andMap14 in the front orien-
tation dominated differently according to whether the SPO/OBT
tasks or the MIR task were performed. Map6 was significantly
more present in the OBT task than in the MIR task ( p 0.010)
and in the SPO task than in the MIR task ( p 0.004). There was
no significant difference between the SPO and OBT tasks ( p 
0.509). We found the inverse pattern for Map14 that was signifi-
cantly more present in the MIR task than in the OBT task ( p 
0.010) and in the MIR task than in the SPO task ( p  0.004).
Again, there was no significant difference between the SPO task
and theOBT task ( p 0.509) (Fig. 3C). Post hoc analysis ofMap6
and Map14 in the back conditions revealed no significant effect
(all p 0.6).
The same statistical analysis for the GEV of Map6 and Map14
(3 2 2 ANOVA with the factors task, orientation, and map)
showed a significant task  map interaction (F(2,16)  4.8; p 
0.023), a significant orientation  map interaction (F(1,8) 
11.604; p  0.009), and a trend for task  orientation  map
interaction (F(2,16)  3.229; p  0.066). Post hoc tests revealed
that the GEV of Map6 and Map14 in the front orientation domi-
nated differently according to whether the SPO/OBT tasks or the
MIR taskwere performed, compatible with the data onmap pres-
ence. The GEV of Map6 was significantly higher in the OBT task
than in theMIR task ( p 0.023) and in the SPO task than in the
MIR task ( p  0.007). There was no significant difference be-
tween the OBT and SPO tasks ( p 0.822). Similar to the GEV of
Map6, the GEV of Map14 was significantly higher in the SPO task
than in the MIR task ( p  0.029), and there was no significant
difference between the SPO and OBT tasks ( p 0.111). In con-
trast, we found no significant difference between the OBT and
MIR tasks ( p 0.826) (Fig. 3D). These data onGEVofMap6 and
Map14 have to be regarded with caution because statistical anal-
ysis was not corrected formultiple comparisons. Post hoc analysis
ofMap6 andMap14 in the back conditions revealed no significant
effect (all p  0.7), also compatible with data on map presence.
These findings were also reflected at single-scalp electrodes as
reported in previous work (Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006;
Mercier et al., 2009).
LAURA localized the main brain activation for Map6 to the
TPJ of both hemispheres [maximum; x, y, z Talairach coordi-
nates; right, (52, 49, 21); left, (53, 49, 21)] with a right
predominant activation and to the posterior parietal cortex of
both hemispheres [right, (15, 70, 47); left, (21, 70, 47)],
close to the intraparietal sulcus, with a left predominant activa-
tion (Fig. 4A). The main brain activations for Map14 were local-
ized in the dorsolateral prefrontal and/or premotor cortex of
both hemispheres [right, (27,25, 54); left, (26,13, 53)]with
a right predominant activation, to the right (54, 7, 13) and
left (54,7,13)mid-to-anterior temporal cortexwith a right
predominant activation and to the right postcentral gyrus (39,
33, 51) (Fig. 4B). Weaker activations were also found in the
right TPJ (52,54, 16) (Fig. 4B).
The segmentation of the group-averaged data also revealed
another EP map (Map11) that was present in the three tasks (Fig.
3B). Map11 appeared between 370 and 555 ms PSO (i.e., 147 ms
earlier than Map6 and Map14) and was more present in the back
than in the front conditions, regardless of the tasks (Fig. 3B). Statis-
tical analysis (3 2 ANOVA with the factors task and orientation)
only showed a significant orientation effect (F(1,8)  25.963; p 
0.001). Post hoc tests (pairwise comparisons, LSD) showed that
Map11 was more present in the back than in the front orientation
( p 0.001). There was no effect of task (F(2,16) 0.077; p 0.927)
and no task orientation interaction (F(2,16) 1.684; p  0.217)
(Fig. 3E). This was also reflected by the GEV, and statistical anal-
ysis showed a significant effect of orientation (F(1,8) 11.781; p
0.009), with the GEV of Map11 being higher in the back than in
the front conditions ( p  0.009). There was no effect of task
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(F(2,16) 23.205; p 0.143) and no task orientation interac-
tion (F(2,16) 0.678; p 0.078) (Fig. 3F).
LAURA localized the generator of Map11 to the TPJ of both
hemispheres [left, (53, 55, 16)]; right, (55, 32, 15)] with a
predominant activation in the left hemisphere (extending also
more anteriorly) (Fig. 4C).We found the same brain activation in
all tasks, suggesting that body transformations in back orienta-
tion may not differ according to the tasks, at least under the
present experimental conditions. However, behavioral analysis
suggests that this may rather be attributable (at least partly) to
task performance in some participants. Although succeeding in
front orientation, the same participants were unable to perform
the requested MIR transformations in back orientation and re-
sponded in the way that they responded in SPO and OBT tasks.
Figure 3. EEG results.A, Visual comparison of the superimposed group-averaged EPswaveforms across 192 electrodes in the front orientation showed a phase of differential responses between
the SPO, OBT, and MIR tasks at517–628ms PSO (the stimulus onset was at 0, as indicated by the light gray line). B, Segments of stable voltage topography during the three tasks are shown in
the time period from 0 to 700 ms. In the front conditions, one EP segment (shown in black; Map6) was present in the SPO and OBT tasks between 517 and 628 ms PSO but not in the MIR task. The
MIR taskwas characterized, during the same time period, by a different segment (shown in gray; Map14). A third EP segment (shown in light gray; Map11) was present in all three tasks in front- and
back-facing orientations, between 370 and 550ms PSO. Note that Map11 wasmore present in the back than in the front conditions. C, Additional analysis showed that Map6 andMap14 dominated
differently according to the tasks but only in the front conditions. Map6 was more present in the OBT task than in the MIR task and in the SPO task than in the MIR task. There was no significant
difference between the SPO and OBT tasks. The inverse pattern was found for the presence of Map14. D, GEV analysis showed that the GEV of Map6 in the front conditions also reflected these
similarity/differences according to the performed task. This was also the case forMap14, except for the comparison between the OBT andMIR tasks that was not found to be significant. E, Statistical
analyses on the presence of Map11 showed that Map11 was significantly more present in the back than in the front conditions. There was no difference between the tasks. F, Reflecting the data on
map presence, the GEV analysis showed that the GEV of Map11 was higher in the back than in the front conditions and did not differ between the tasks.
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This may underline that mental body
transformation in back orientation is the
most difficult of all tested body transfor-
mations, in accordance with previous
work (Arzy et al., 2006; Mohr et al., 2006;
Easton et al., 2009). We therefore suggest
that we were not able to distinguish SPO/
OBT from MIR task related to brain acti-
vations in the back orientation because, in
the MIR task, the performance was more
variable and several participants actually
performed OBT transformations.
To further analyze the differences be-
tween brain activations reflecting the
SPO/OBT tasks versus theMIR task in the
front orientation, we performed addi-
tional statistical analysis at the level of the
reconstructed sources. Statistical analysis
was performed by calculating the mean
difference between source estimations of
the SPO/OBT tasks and the MIR task in
the front orientation (comparing the av-
erage of the SPO/OBT tasks with the MIR
task between 517 and 628 ms PSO). This
analysis identified eight clusters of solu-
tion points with robust responses (that we
labeled from “cluster 1” to “cluster 8”)
(Table 3). The smallest and largest clusters
contained 5 and 105 contiguous solution
points, respectively (Table 3). Activations
that were stronger in the SPO/OBT tasks
were found in the left TPJ [(60, 42,
2); cluster 1], left precuneus [(34,
72, 35); cluster 2], and right occipital
cortex [(15, 78, 34); cluster 3] (Fig. 5,
indicated in green; Table 3). Activations
that were stronger in the MIR task were
found in the right inferior occipital cortex
[(21, 93, 5; cluster 4], right postcen-
tral gyrus [(33, 31, 54); cluster 5], right
premotor cortex [(31,2, 52); cluster 6],
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [(27,
48, 30); cluster 7], and right anterior tem-
poral cortex [(57, 15, 9; cluster 8]
(Fig. 5, indicated in blue; Table 3). Ac-
cordingly, eight ANOVAs were calculated
(Bonferroni’s corrected   0.00625; see
Materials andMethods). The right inferior
occipital cortex (cluster 4; task solution
point interaction), right postcentral gyrus
(cluster 5; effect of task), right premotor
cortex (cluster 6; task  solution point
interaction), right anterior temporal cor-
tex (cluster 8; task solution point inter-
action), and left TPJ (cluster 1; task 
solution point interaction) revealed sig-
nificant differences. Most clusters were
more strongly activated during the MIR
task, except the left TPJ. Note that all the
clusters showed a significant effect of so-
lution point (data not reported) (Table 3).
To summarize, our EP data show that
explicit mental body transformations
Figure 4. Source localization ofMap6, Map14, andMap11. A, An inverse solution localized the generators of Map6mainly to the
TPJ of both hemisphereswith a right predominant activation and to the posterior parietal cortex of both hemispheres, close to the
intraparietal sulcus, with a left predominant activation. B, The generators of Map14 were localized in the dorsolateral prefrontal
and/or premotor cortex of both hemispheres with a right predominant activation, to the right and left mid-to-anterior temporal
cortex with a right predominant activation, and to the right postcentral gyrus. C, The generators of Map11 were localized to the
TPJ of both hemispheres, with a predominant activation in the left hemisphere extending also more anteriorly.
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with embodied self-location (MIR task)
activatedmore strongly the inferior occip-
ital cortex, postcentral gyrus, anterior
temporal cortex, and premotor cortex of
the right hemisphere. Spontaneous (SPO
task) and explicit mental body transfor-
mations with disembodied self-location
(OBT task) tend to differ from the MIR
task, in generating greater activation in
the left TPJ. This was found to occur for
the front orientation in the time period
between 517 and 628 ms PSO. Concern-
ing timing, studies on disembodied self-
location (Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al.,
2006) found themean onset of TPJ activa-
tion at370 ms,140 ms earlier than in
the present front conditions and at the
same time as in the present back condi-
tions. First, differences in visual stimuli
may have induced this timing difference:
the human body was static (previous work)
or dynamic (present study). Second, the in-
formation relative to the left/right response
wasprovided simultaneouslywith thevisual
stimulus onset (previous work) or delayed
(present study; the onset of avatar tilt was delayed from stimulus
onset by 50 ms). Moreover, because the tilt of the avatar is ex-
tended in time, the leaning direction only becomes available over
time. Third, body positions were different and participants
were in seated/prone position (previous work) or standing po-
sition (present study). Fourth, participants indicated their right/
left judgments via finger responses (previous work) or leaned
while pressing the button on the bar (present study).
Our EP data further show that brain activations for spontane-
ous as well as explicit OBT transformations start earlier for the
back orientation (370–555 ms) than the front orientation (517–
628 ms), reflecting the overt behavior of our participants. These
dissociations were confirmed by analyzing the moment of occur-
rence of the respective transformationmap (time frame of best cor-
relation) in the SPO and OBT tasks. We again found that it
occurred earlier in the back orientation than in the front orien-
tation, reflecting RTs in the same conditions. The same pattern,
reflecting RTs, was found for the MIR task. This dependence of
map onset on stimulus orientation, that is the transformation
maps in the front orientation occurring after their onset in the
back orientation, is compatible with our behavioral observation
thatmental body transformationswith disembodied and embod-
ied self-location in the front orientation were more difficult
(longer RTs and higher error rates) than in the back orientation.
These EP data have to be regarded with caution because our total
number of artifact-free trials per condition was low (because of
the standing position and the prolonged procedure).
Furthermore, we hypothesize that leaning performance, RTs,
as well as associated brain activation in the SPO task concord in
suggesting that participants imagined their body spontaneously
to be localized at the position of the tightrope walker’s body.
Leaning performancewasmost variable in the back orientation in
the MIR task, and RTs did not allow us to distinguish whether
participants in this condition usedmental own-body transforma-
tion with an embodied or disembodied self-location. This was
also reflected in the EP data because MIR, OBT, and SPO tasks
were associated with the same brain activation. The back orien-
tation is the condition with highest difficulty (Arzy et al., 2006;
Mohr et al., 2006; Easton et al., 2009), andmay also be character-
Figure 5. Differential source localizations between SPO/OBT tasks versus MIR task activations at 517–628 ms PSO. The SPO/
OBT tasks generated stronger activations in the left TPJ (60,42,2), the left precuneus (34,72, 35), and the right
occipital cortex (15,78, 34). TheMIR taskmore activated the right inferior occipital cortex (21,93,5), the right postcentral
gyrus (33,31, 54), the right premotor cortex (31,2, 52), the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (27, 48, 30), and the right
anterior temporal cortex.
Table 3. Results of the statistical analyses (repeated-measures ANOVAs) for the eight identified clusters of solution points
Cluster # Hemisphere Number of SPs Task effect Task SP interaction SPs with p 0.05 Smallest p value Talairach coordinates Localization
1 Left 22 NS F(21,168) 3.81 0 p 0.0507 60.73,42.2,2.79 Temporo-parietal junction
p 0.0001**
2 Left 14 NS NS
3 Right 5 NS NS
4 Right 18 NS F(17,136) 2.33 10 p 0.0403 21.27,93.68,5.56 Inferior occipital cortex
p 0.0037**
5 Right 12 F(1,8) 18.36 F(11,88) 2.03 12 p 0.0008 33.76,31.29, 54.55 Postcentral gyrus
p 0.0027** p 0.0348*
6 Right 27 F(1,8) 11.26 F(26,208) 4.51 27 p 0.0072 31.68,2.17, 52.65 Premotor cortex
p 0.0100* p 0.0001**
7 Right 14 F(1,8) 10.44 NS 12 p 0.0068 27.67, 48.27, 30.02 Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
p 0.0120*
8 Right 105 F(1,8) 10.81 F(104,832) 1.90 105 p 0.0111 57.57,15.95,9.93 Anterior temporal cortex
p 0.0111* p 0.0001**
Clusters 1, 4, 6, and 8 showed a significant task solution point interaction, and cluster 5 showed a significant effect of task. Concerning cluster 1, post hoc tests only reported a trend (* 0.05; ** 0.00625, Bonferroni’s corrected).
SP, Solution point.
7210 • J. Neurosci., May 26, 2010 • 30(21):7202–7214 Thirioux et al. • Spontaneous Disembodied Self-Location during Active Self–Other Interactions
ized by higher intersubject variability concerning embodied and
disembodied rotation strategies.
Discussion
In ecologically more valid conditions, we investigated the neural
mechanisms of spontaneous self-location and mental own-body
transformations when standing and moving participants inter-
acted with an avatar. The present behavioral and electrophysio-
logical approach highlights the advantage and importance of
EEG-based functional imaging in such interactions. Other neu-
roimaging techniques such as fMRI, PET, and magnetoencepha-
lography are performed in the supine or sitting position and
require head fixation and absence of body/headmovements dur-
ing the recording of brain activity. The present study demon-
strates the feasibility of EP mapping and electrical neuroimaging
under experimental conditions that approach naturalistic sit-
uations of spontaneous interactions in standing and moving
humans. We here show that spontaneous mental body transfor-
mations (SPO task) in response to the avatar’s body tilts trigger
indistinguishable behavioral and neural patterns as explicit men-
tal body transformations with disembodied self-location (OBT
task), i.e., when participants leaned while imagining themselves
in the avatar’s body position via a translocation of the egocentric
viewpoint (Berthoz, 1991; Vogeley and Fink, 2003). This differed
from explicit mental body transformations with embodied self-
location (MIR task), when participants imagined their body at its
actual body position (egocentric viewpoint) and the avatar’s
movements as their own movements as reflected in a mirror,
eliciting the opposite behavioral pattern and recruiting partially
distinct neural mechanisms. In the SPO/OBT tasks, tilt perfor-
mance (with preservation of the lateral asymmetry) decreased
andRTs increasedwith the increase of the rotation angle between
the participants’ body and the avatar’s body. In the MIR task, tilt
performance (in mirror reversal) increased from the back to the
front orientation.
In the front conditions, these indistinguishable behavioral
patterns in the SPO/OBT tasks, differing from theMIR task, were
further reflected in the EPs. The segmentation and fitting proce-
dure showed that a single template EPmap (Map6) characterized
the SPO andOBT tasks at 517–628ms, whereas theMIR task was
characterized at the same time period by another template EP
map (Map14). Statistical analysis confirmed thatMap6 significantly
differed between the SPO/OBT tasks and the MIR task. Map14
showed the opposite patternduring the same timeperiod. Thus, the
topography was the same between the SPO and OBT tasks but
differently modulated between the SPO/OBT tasks and the MIR
task. This shows that different stable brain microstates underlie
the SPO/OBT tasks and theMIR task, suggesting the recruitment
of different neural generators. At 517–628 ms, the SPO/OBT
tasks tended to more activate some solution points of the cluster
localized to the left TPJ compared with the MIR task. Despite a
significant task solution points interaction, we consider these
results with caution because the post hoc tests revealed a trend,
probably attributable to the relative low number of our EP data.
Althoughpreliminary, this finding seems to corroborate previous
studies revealing that the TPJ is involved in multisensory coding
of the human body and self (Lobel et al., 1998; Blanke et al., 2002,
2004; Kahane et al., 2003), visual processing of human bodies
(Beauchamp et al., 2002; Grossman and Blake, 2002), andmental
own-body imagery for full human bodies (Zacks et al., 1999;
Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006). Concordant with studies
reporting TJP activation in explicit own-body transformation
tasks with disembodied self-location (Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et
al., 2006), our results suggest the involvement of the left TPJ for
spontaneous disembodied self-location in the standing position.
We found no differential activation between the tasks at the right
TPJ (although this region was found to be activated when local-
izing Map6). This somewhat differs with previous work on dis-
embodied self-location with healthy subjects (Blanke et al., 2005;
Arzy et al., 2006) and data from neurological patients with lesion
at the right TPJ and OBEs (Blanke et al., 2002, 2004). However,
the left TPJ recruitment may be coherent with the lesion loca-
tion in patients with a related visual own-body illusion called
heautoscopy, i.e., pathological embodiment and self-location
in which patients experience to see, in front of them, a redu-
plication of their own body (Menninger-Lerchenthal, 1935;
He´caen and Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Brugger et al., 1994; Brugger,
2002). Interestingly, heautoscopy mostly occurs in the standing
position, whereas OBEs occur in the seated/prone position (same
as by Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006). We suggest that this
trend for left TPJ activation in our datamay be attributable to the
participant’s standing position. This concords with Brugger’s
proposition (2002) that heautoscopy, in addition to deficient
multisensory own-body processing, relies on deviant perspective-
taking mechanisms, occurring under normal conditions sponta-
neously within self–other interactions in the standing position.
The left TPJ activation in our SPO/OBT tasks relying on imagined
changes in self-locationmay be, thus, compatible with the role of
the TPJ in third-person perspective (3PP), conceptual (Ruby and
Decety, 2003; Schulte-Ru¨ther et al., 2007), visuospatial (Maguire
et al., 1998; Vallar et al., 1999), and perceptual (Ruby andDecety,
2001; Vogeley and Fink, 2003; Decety and Lamm, 2007; Blanke
and Metzinger, 2009) perspective-taking. According to a neuro-
imaging meta-analysis (Decety and Lamm, 2007), the TPJ impli-
cation in multisensory body-related information processing,
self-body processing, and social–cognitive abilities suggests its im-
plication in inferring other’s bodily, mental and emotional states,
actions, intentions, and in experiencing the other’s perspective. We
here hypothesize that the similar properties in leaning, RTs, and left
TPJ activation in the SPO and OBT tasks suggest that participants
automatically embodied the avatar’s perspective (3PP), i.e., located
themselves spontaneously in the avatar’s body.
Although probably recruiting also the TPJ, embodied imagery
in the front orientation was significantly associated with stronger
activations at the premotor, postcentral gyrus, inferior occipital
cortex, and anterior temporal cortex of the right hemisphere. The
frontal activation pattern differs from that found in previous
work using similar tasks, revealing activations in temporo-
parietal and temporo-occipital cortex (Arzy et al., 2006), proba-
bly as a result of task/stimulus differences. The standing position
and leaning movements (seated/prone position and finger re-
sponse in the study by Arzy et al., 2006) may have enhanced
motor/executive components and a higher frontal recruitment.
However, these activations cannot be explained as themere effect
of standing position and leaning movement (or the observation
of the avatar) because they were absent in SPO/OBT tasks. These
frontal activations are also not related tomotor loads or response
differences, suggesting that MIR task-specific transformations
induced the frontal activations. We cannot exclude that partici-
pants performed the MIR task into a mirror imitation task,
known to activate the premotor/prefrontal cortex (Iacoboni et
al., 1999). We rather hypothesize that these frontal activations
were caused by self-attribution processes: participants may have
attributed the avatar’s movements to themselves, by imagining
her movements as their own-body movements as reflected in a
mirror. This could be further concordant with neuroimaging
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data showing that self-attribution of another’s actions or emo-
tions activates the premotor and prefrontal cortex (Carr et al.,
2003; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Schulte-Ru¨ther et al., 2007). More-
over, the activation of the right or bilateral premotor and/or pre-
frontal cortex may corroborate the proposed dominance of the
right prefrontal cortex in self-referential processing, first-person
perspective (1PP) (Devinsky, 2000; Fossati et al., 2003; Northoff
andBermpohl, 2004), and self-recognition in front-facing images
of one’s face (Keenan et al., 2000; Uddin et al., 2005). The activa-
tions of the right inferior occipital cortex, associated with self-
face recognition (Uddin et al., 2005), and the right anterior
temporal cortex, associated with representation of social con-
cepts (Zahn et al., 2007) but also self-face (Platek et al., 2006),
further confirm the recruitment of self-referential processes. This
suggests that imagining/simulating the avatar’s body as one’s
own body as reflected in a mirror is sufficient to activate brain
areas related to self-recognition. Moreover, the selective activa-
tion of the right postcentral gyrus in the MIR task supports pre-
vious work on perspective-taking, showing that first-person
conceptual perspective and 1PP in emotional contexts more ac-
tivates the postcentral gyrus compared with 3PP (Ruby and De-
cety, 2003, 2004). Accordingly, we hypothesize that these
different behavioral–neural patterns in embodied and disembod-
ied self-location may relate to first-person (MIR task) and third-
person (SPO/OBT task) perspective-taking, respectively, linking
the neural mechanisms of perspective-taking to those of mental
body transformations (Keehner et al., 2006).
Although not tested specifically in the present experiment, we
speculate that interacting with the avatar, especially in the MIR
task, may have reliedmore strongly on some core components of
the human mirror neuron system (hMNS) in premotor cortex
(Binkofski and Buccino, 2006), whereas this was less the case in
the SPO/OBT tasks. This is of interest to previous studies on
hMNS, suggesting that 1PP and self-attribution are linked to the
hMNS (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Carr et al.,
2003; Gallese, 2007; Shmuelof and Zohary, 2008). Thus, observ-
ing and imitating the others’ actions, observing complementary
and imitative actions (Newman-Norlund et al., 2007), or imag-
ining own actions (Buccino et al., 2001, 2004; Filimon et al., 2007)
enhance premotor, parietal, temporo-parietal, and inferior fron-
tal activity, comparable with activity changes when observers ex-
ecute these actions (Gre`zes et al., 2003; Schulte-Ru¨ther et al.,
2007). Our results may reinforce this hypothesis showing that
this is only the case during embodiedmental imagery at 517–628
ms after stimulus onset. This also suggests that the hMNS activa-
tion in the frontal cortex depends on whether participants inter-
act with other individuals from 1PP or 3PP and that the
activation of the hMNS in the frontal cortex may be less promi-
nent during disembodied self-location.
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